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This article examines how human rights international non-governmental organizations (hereafter
HROs) can increase the level of political protest in neighboring states. Previous research suggests local
activities of HROs help to generate mobilization for protests against governments. This article shows
that the presence of HROs in neighboring states can be a substitute for domestic HROs; if domestic
HROs are already ﬂourishing, there will be less of a ‘neighbor’ effect. At sufﬁciently high levels of
domestic HRO prevalence within a state, neighboring HROs help domestic HROs use institutionalized
substitutes for protest mobilization strategies. Spatial econometric methods are used to test the
implications of this theory. These results illuminate the role that non-governmental organizations play in
these domestic political processes, and demonstrate the transnational nature of their activities.
Non-violent political protest is a direct vehicle for citizens to express their views to their
governments in order to demand and engender political change. The achievements of protest
movements are numerous and include historical landmarks like the granting of greater civil
rights to the African American community in the United States, the end of apartheid in South
Africa, the end of British colonialization in India, and the sparking of democratization
processes across post-Soviet countries. Civil society organizations, especially organizations
that promote democracy or have a human rights focus, are often important catalysts for these
protests. They help organize people on the ground, provide them resources for successful
protest activities, including training on non-violent protest techniques, material resources for
these activities, and information on the location of targets. Thus, countries with a rich array
of civil society organizations, like South Africa or the United States, are able to mobilize
civilians to bring about seminal political changes successfully. If civil society organizations are
a key catalyst to non-violent protest, how do protest movements achieve their goals when
their countries lack a vibrant civil society sector? Are citizens in these states simply less able
to organize and participate in non-violent protest, limiting their recourse to political change?
Or, could civil society organizations in neighboring states help serve this catalyzing role in the
absence of a developed domestic sector?
In this article, we argue that civil society organizations both within a state and in
the geographic neighborhood of a state can serve to increase the occurrence of
domestic non-violent anti-government protests. This implies that states with weak civil
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society sectors can still experience popular protests that help spark political change,
particularly when the advocacy gap left by a lack of domestic civil society organizations
is ﬁlled by organizations in neighboring states helping to mobilize citizens from across
the border.
Indeed, examples of such cross-border activity abound. In Eastern Europe after the fall
of the Soviet Union, for instance, civil society organizations often worked across borders
to encourage non-violent protests in countries without a strong domestic civil society
sector, which often led to political transformation. Organizations within Romania,
Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine had a strong inﬂuence on democratization
processes in neighboring countries.1 Based on their previous domestic experiences with
democratization, members of organizations from these countries that promote rights
crossed borders and shared successful techniques and experiences with citizens in
neighboring states, helping to bring about the ‘electoral revolutions’ key to the third wave
of democracy. Romanians and Bulgarians helped the Slovaks, the Slovaks in turn helped
Croatians and Serbians, and Serbians and Georgians helped Ukrainians to bring about
the ‘Orange Revolution’ that captured world attention in 2004 and 2005.2
More recently, in 2011, as protests swept the Middle East and North Africa, members
of organizations set up to promote rights served as important conduits for domestic
mobilization and coordination resources. Not all organizations playing an active role in
mobilizing non-violent protest in the region had members based in the state where
the protests were occurring. Instead, these organizations were able to contribute by
sending their members across borders from neighboring countries. Syria is a potent case.
Even before the ﬁrst non-violent protests started within the country, rights-promoting
organizations from neighboring countries had a ﬁrm presence within the state. In fact,
starting in 2007, European Union programs for promoting democracy in Syria had made
use of organizations from Lebanon; other organizations, like Human Rights Watch, had
made use of members from Jordan and Turkey.3 In a way, the work of organizations
from neighboring states in Syria was ﬁlling in or substituting for domestic civil
society activities, which even the First Lady of Syria, Asma Al-Assad, has noted were
historically absent.4
While the above illustrations highlight that cross-border activism can play a key role in
non-violent protest, there has been little work in political science aimed at determining the
degree to which this dynamic plays out generally. Thus, in order to begin addressing this
important topic, we focus on the degree to which international civil society organizations
work across borders, concentrating on one particular type of organization: international
human rights-promoting non-governmental organizations (human rights INGOs or, as
used hereafter, HROs). The activities of HROs provide the best example of civil society
organizations participating in this cross-border activism. HROs campaign globally for a
broad variety of rights, including civil rights, women’s and children’s rights, and personal
security from imprisonment and torture. HROs also promote human security broadly
deﬁned, including rights to housing, a safe and clean environment, and a basic standard of
living. The extant literature is also clear that HROs use several different mechanisms to
achieve their rights-promotion goals, including education, international advocacy, and
1 Bunce and Wolchik 1996.
2 Bunce and Wolchik 1996, 12.
3 EEAS 2011; Human Rights Watch 2011.
4 Al-Assad 2010.
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the promotion of non-violent protest techniques.5 Thus, HROs’ broad focus and range of
strategies provides us with a particularly rich sub-sample for studying the work of
international civil society organizations and their effects on domestic non-violent protest
across borders.
The theory predicts that the intensiﬁed domestic mobilization that accompanies non-
violent protest is a necessary step in the processes through which political change, human
rights improvements, and democratization occur.6 The argument developed here suggests
that, given the ﬁnite resources of organizations composed of rational actors, we should
observe substitution of advocacy: when local organizations are underdeveloped, members
of organizations from neighboring countries (‘neighborhood HROs’) lend a helping hand
to aid domestic non-violent protest. In addition to our advocacy substitution argument,
and similar to Pippa Norris’s idea of ‘repertoires’ of political action, we posit that
the interactions of domestic and neighboring HROs also display a ceiling effect, where
neighborhood HROs, if aiding domestic political action at all, work through a
substitution of strategies dynamic.7 When domestic HROs are strongly established and
effectively able to inﬂuence mobilization themselves, we do not expect larger numbers of
neighborhood HROs to lead to more non-violent protest. If anything, in this situation, we
expect high numbers of neighborhood HROs to be associated only with less visible
advocacy behaviors, which typically serve as more viable substitutes for non-violent
protest in those countries allowing for a vibrant civil society sector.
We examine the testable implications of our theoretical argument using a dataset of
domestic and neighborhood HROs worldwide from 1990 to 2003. We ﬁnd support for our
overall arguments: advocacy from organizations geographically connected to the state
can substitute for the increased occurrence of non-violent protest from domestic HROs.
At high levels of domestic and neighborhood involvement, however, we ﬁnd diminishing
returns. This is consistent with our arguments of both advocacy substitution and strategy
substitution.
What are the broader implications of these theoretical arguments? First, this study
advances our understanding of the processes through which HROs work to promote
rights. It highlights a fundamental causal logic of HRO behavior, demonstrating
how organizational constraints and opportunity structures inﬂuence strategies and,
consequently, when and where we will see organizations inﬂuence domestic non-violent
protest ‘beyond borders’. This logic contradicts the predominant view that a greater
number of organizations have a proportional linear and positive effect on mobilization
and advocacy outcomes. This ‘more is better’ understanding of advocacy has dominated
the literature.8 Instead of more HROs automatically leading to more non-violent protest,
more HROs can inﬂuence a change in strategies from non-violent protest to more direct
participation in institutional methods such as voting and lobbying. This study of the
effects of neighborhood HROs on domestic non-violent protest also furthers our
understanding of the necessity for domestic civil society to have developed to a certain
5 Franklin 2008; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers
2005; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Schmitz 2002.
6 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.
7 Norris 2002.
8 Notable exceptions to this idea include Cooley and Ron (2002), with reference to proliferation of
service as opposed to advocacy organizations, and a formal model by Aldashev and Verdier (2010), that
outlines a tipping point hypothesis about development NGOs.
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degree as a precondition for such a protest. HROs that are not active within the target
country can still inﬂuence non-violent protest mobilization through their members in
neighboring states. This understanding of domestic–international interplay is important not
just for those interested in ‘second-image reversed’ scholarship but also for international
policy makers who want to inﬂuence mobilization in states with a nascent civil society.
Below, after outlining the extant literature on HRO involvement in domestic mobilization,
we develop our theoretical argument on the substitution of advocacy and substitution of
strategies. We then present our research design and main empirical ﬁndings. Further
discussions highlight the ways in which strategies can be substituted at high levels of domestic
HRO involvement. We conclude by further delineating the theoretical contribution of this
research and its broader implications for the larger community promoting human rights
and democracy.
EXISTING PERSPECTIVES ON HROS AND NON-VIOLENT PROTEST MOBILIZATION
How do HROs affect the occurrence of non-violent protest? Initially, non-violent protests
require coordination resources, like communication devices, organizers, and meeting
spaces, for domestic actors.9 Often, these resources are provided by organizations. Kriesi
distinguishes between four types of formal organizations who may all be working for
similar goals and inﬂuence non-violent protest within a state: (1) parties and interest
groups who may help represent the common goals in the institutional arena, (2) support
organizations such as friendly media and churches, (3) movement associations created to
cater to the daily needs of movement members and to help maintain commitment, and,
ﬁnally, (4) social movement organizations themselves.10 Social movement organizations
are distinguished from all other formal organizations by one singular feature – they work
directly to mobilize citizens for their cause and are in turn dependent on successful
mobilization to achieve their organizational goals. Kriesi uses Amnesty International, a
prominent HRO, as a prime example of a social movement organization that has
increased non-violent protest mobilization in Europe.11
Indeed, it seems that there is good reason to suspect that HROs seek out domestic
protest movements to support. A signiﬁcant strain of the larger literature on civil society
organizations and funding agencies highlights how domestic actors using non-violent
actions often receive more resources than those using violent actions through the radical
ﬂank effect.12 Here, domestic actors that use non-violent actions are seen as more
legitimate and, thus, receive greater resources and assistance from foundations and
organizations. An additional reason for prioritizing support to these non-violent actors
includes the political success associated with these non-violent strategies.13
The role of international and domestic civil society organizations, both with and
without a human rights focus, in mobilizing domestic non-violent protest is also well
established in the protest literature on the United States. For example, Heaney and
Rojas surveyed 5,410 demonstrators in anti-war protests in the United States and
found that the majority of protesters were connected to at least one international or
9 Andrews and Biggs 2006; Haines 1984.
10 Kriesi 1996.
11 Kriesi 1996.
12 Haines 1984.
13 Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008.
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domestic organization.14 In line with the classic social mobilization literature, these
organizations serve to connect individuals to the overall movement, increasing their
participation.15
Within the literature on HROs themselves, there is also a focus on how organizations
must mobilize domestic non-violent protest in order to achieve their larger rights-
promotion goals. Although this literature also highlights the role HROs have in
international advocacy (i.e. ‘shaming and blaming’), Keck and Sikkink’s transnational
advocacy network or ‘boomerang’ framework rests on the idea that HROs, when called
by a domestic population, help mobilize domestic opposition to repressive government
practices.16 The subsequent spiral model of Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink also stresses that
domestic mobilization is necessary to ensure that international advocacy results in
sustained democratization or political change.17
Likewise, there is an extensive case study literature documenting the effects of HROs on
non-violent protest. For example, Schock highlights the role of HROs in aiding domestic
non-violent protest in the Philippines in the early 1980s through their advocacy efforts
and provision of material resources, such as providing space for protesters to gather.18
A second example is that of HROs providing essential training on non-violent protest
strategies, resources, and advocacy support in South Africa.19 As mentioned, the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine was strongly dependent on HROs and other organizations
providing training and material resources to non-violent protesters, including cell phones,
which helped activists stay in better communication.20 Boulding ﬁnds similar dynamics in
Bolivia in 1999 and 2004 where organizations provided ‘ﬁnancial, educational, [and]
infrastructural’ resources to aid in political participation.21
Cross-nationally, Murdie and Bhasin ﬁnd support for HRO presence yielding greater
levels of domestic non-violent protest through ‘ﬁeld-building’. HROs serve to expand the
‘ﬁeld’ of domestic actors by connecting them to a larger network of goods and people who
can aid their mobilization efforts. This direct intended effect on non-violent protest events
is differentiated by Murdie and Bhasin from the unintended diffusion effect of HROs on
violent protest, where there is inadvertent use of HRO resources by domestic actors
utilizing violent strategies.22
Although the above literature has greatly expanded our understanding of the effects of
civil society organizations, including HROs, on non-violent protest, the majority of this
literature focuses on what happens within a domestic context – how international
organizational presence within the borders of a country inﬂuences domestic groups to
increase mobilization. To reiterate, this extant literature does focus on how international
organizations can be involved domestically; what is largely missing, however, is how
externally-based resources and members of international organizations cross borders and
become involved in domestic mobilization. This is problematic: if, as Keck and Sikkink
make clear, rights-promoting organizations are supposed to work to answer domestic
14 Heaney and Rojas 2011.
15 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001.
16 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
17 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.
18 Schock 2005.
19 Taylor 2002.
20 Wallander 2005.
21 Boulding 2010, 458.
22 Murdie and Bhasin 2011.
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demands for assistance, we need a more concrete understanding of which organizations
are going to respond to these calls.23 This is also important for rights-promotion. As
many repressive regimes restrict the work of organizations critical of the regime inside
their borders, organizations have to be more creative in how they can deliver coordination
goods to aid non-violent protest movements, particularly in those states with a limited or
nascent civil society.24
The literature on coordination resources and non-violent protest clearly lays out that
protest resources diffuse across geographic locations and across groups.25 Speciﬁcally on
organizational resources, Bell, Clay, and Murdie argue, in line with the boomerang or
transnational advocacy network model, that organizations in neighboring states can serve
as ‘ﬁrst responders’ providing assistance and fostering mobilization that ultimately leads
to improvements in human rights. Bell, Clay, and Murdie ﬁnd support for this argument
in a global sample of countries in the post-Cold War era. Although Bell, Clay, and
Murdie take us one step closer to understanding the role of HROs across borders, the
authors focus on the more distant outcome of ultimate improvement in human rights
records and not on the more crucial intermediate step of domestic non-violent protest.26
Another missing component in the broader literature is a theoretical discussion of how
organizations within a country and within the geographic neighborhood interact in
mobilization efforts. If there is a real coordinated or network factor at work in rights-
promotion organizational advocacy behavior, we should expect the work of organizations
domestically and organizations within the neighborhood to condition each other.27 Thus,
if Bell, Clay, and Murdie’s causal story is correct, we should expect neighborhood
organizations to work to promote democracy and improve human rights by mobilizing
domestic actors to protest non-violently against their state.28 Because of this, countries
without a strong HRO presence may still have active protest mobilization through the
utilization of resources from organizations in neighboring states. We present a descriptive
case example of this process below.
NEIGHBORHOOD HROS AND NON-VIOLENT PROTEST IN BURMA
Cases of non-violent protest in Burma (Myanmar) illustrate the role played by
neighborhood HROs when domestic organizations were not allowed a strong presence,
if one at all. For the years that we have data, Burma had an average of 9.8 HROs with
members in the state, while its neighbors had an average of 37.7 such organizations with a
member presence across the same time period. Since military junta rule in 1962, gross
human rights abuses and a closed political system have suppressed all domestically-
organized dissent, and led the country, once rich in natural resources, to become one of
the least developed in the world.29
Burma has seen a strong opposition movement led by the National League of
Democracy and its members, but this opposition movement has largely not involved
23 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
24 ICNL 2009.
25 Andrews and Biggs 2006; Haines 1984.
26 Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012.
27 DeMars, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998.
28 Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012.
29 Burma Proﬁle. BBC News. Last accessed on 8 August 2012 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-paciﬁc-12990563.
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ordinary citizens.30 Two exceptions to this are the largely non-violent protests of 1988 and
the protests of 2007. Both protest periods saw hundreds of thousands of Burmese come
out in the streets to demand full democracy. Both periods also had the same two sets of
protagonists, students and Buddhist monks. These protests, the latter set in particular,
were essential in bringing about the slow democratic reforms the military junta has
undertaken, including the opening of the April 2012 parliamentary elections to opposition
members of the National League for Democracy.
HRO volunteers in neighboring countries, particularly from organizations based in
Thailand, provided critical support and resources to these protest movements. After a
government crackdown in 1988, many protestors ﬂed to the border region of Thailand to
escape torture and imprisonment at the hands of the junta. Some went on to form the
Forum for Democracy in Burma (FDB). The FDB is a coalition of student organizations,
women’s groups and workers’ unions based in Thailand. The FDB groups also have links
with students and party workers inside Burma.31 In 2007, it was student groups associated
with the FDB that led the protests which later turned into the ‘saffron revolution’
supported by the monks.
Groups like the FDB work from their bases in Thailand to empower Burmese actors
and document atrocities committed by the military junta, sharing this information with
world media and members of other HROs, such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, which then help bring greater world attention to events within Burma.32
Amnesty International, for example, also works from their base in Thailand on human
rights education with the larger goal of conﬂict alleviation and reduction of human rights
abuses against the Burmese people, especially the Karen ethnic group. Ofﬁcials from
Amnesty International have written on the rich network of organizations in the Thai
border area working on the same goals.33
Founded in Thailand in 2006, Burma Partnership is another large regional forum
consisting of groups scattered across Indonesia, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, and the
Philippines.34 Its mission is to improve collaboration between Burmese pro-democracy
groups and solidarity groups around Asia. Burma Partnership provides Amnesty
International’s campaigning manual to all its activists on their website and links directly
to reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on Burma. At a rally held
in the Philippines in 2010, Amnesty International members and others called for non-
violent dialogue to be held between the military junta and the opposition.35 Recently,
Burma’s main opposition leader publicly acknowledged the support of Amnesty
International members for her campaign for democratic reforms in Burma.36 The
organization worked to send resources to the country, such as thousands of radios and
30 Beer 1999.
31 Forum for Democracy in Burma’s website in English – http://en.fdburma.org. The About Us and
Members section lists these groups and their location along the Burma–Thailand border.
32 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/007/2009/en/a1e17ccc-9353-418c-a04f-faee4bdb9249/
asa160072009en.html.
33 A Personal Experience on the Thai-Burma Border. Wendy Hughes. Amnesty International. http://
bathamnesty.org.uk/2012/05/20/a-personal-experience-on-the-thai-burma-border.
34 Burma Partnership Website. Section called Tools for Activists. http://www.burmapartnership.org/
tools-for-activists.
35 http://burmapartnership.org/2010elections/2010/11/activists-urge-burmese-junta-to-start-genuine-
dialogue-with-opposition.
36 http://www.amnesty.org.nz/news/timeline-aung-san-suu-kyi-and-amnesty-international.
Taking the Fight to Them 859
several sets of walkie-talkies and satellite kits, which have been delivered to citizens in
remote areas of the country to keep them informed of their rights and the support they
have internationally.37 In such ways, HROs from neighboring countries have direct local
impact on Burmese opposition movements through these resource initiatives. Indeed, it
appears that the vacuum of civil society organizations inside Burma, which has been
created through fear of persecution by the Burmese military junta, is being actively ﬁlled
by civil society organizations led by citizens in exile in partnership with members of HROs
from within neighboring states.
THEORY
Given the existing literature, together with a multitude of anecdotal cases, we argue that
neighborhood HROs can substitute for domestic HROs in mobilizing non-violent protest.
We also argue, however, that, when there are high levels of domestic HROs within a
country already, neighborhood HROs are less likely to aid domestic groups. In cases
where they do aid domestic groups, HROs lead local populations to substitute alternative
strategies for non-violent protest, particularly directing them to pursue more
institutionalized strategies for political advocacy.
Underlying both of these theoretical arguments is an understanding that HROs are
organizations with ﬁnite resources and both local and international goals.38 Therefore,
HROs want to use their ﬁnite resources in such a way as to maximize their effectiveness
and achieve their goal, i.e. global improvements in human rights practices. This implies
that HROs form cross-border strategies, working beyond their state in ways to aid foreign
movements. Given localized knowledge and the need for easy movement of mobilization
tools, like cell phones or walkie-talkies, it follows that HROs will use these cross-border
strategies within their immediate vicinity. Since resources are ﬁnite and the goals are
applicable across multiple states, if the HRO sector is well-established in states like
Turkey and Thailand, we expect members to be willing to cross borders to aid in
mobilization of their neighbors in Syria and Burma, respectively. This could occur as a
spontaneous member decision to aid in the efforts of neighboring domestic mobilization
attempts or through organized forums such as the Burma Partnership, discussed above.
These expectations are very much in keeping with the overall protest diffusion argument
that, once resources have been used within one locale, members can diffuse these resources
through the immediate neighborhood.39 This, as mentioned, occurred in post-Soviet Eastern
Europe.40 A similar example of an organized strategy of diffusion was found in Sudan where
HROs sent members with resources through the Kenyan-Sudanese border.41
As discussed in the Burmese case, HRO resources for non-violent protest take a variety
of forms – educational and training materials, discussing the need for non-violent
mobilization, as well as material resources such as cell phones, meeting places, radios,
or walkie-talkies. All these resources from neighboring HROs can have an effect on
37 http://pthblog.amnesty.org.uk/break-the-silence-beat-the-junta-2.
38 Bob 2005; Prakash and Gugerty, 2010.
39 See Andrews and Biggs 2006.We remain agnostic about the existence of long-distance connectivities.
Our review of cases of protest mobilization by HROs did not indicate any clear examples of trade or
investment connectivities, for example. Future research on other pathways along which HRO resources
are diffused is deﬁnitely necessary.
40 Bunce and Wolchik 1996.
41 Matthews 2010.
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non-violent protest mobilization in the target country.42 The key point here is that, in
countries with a dearth of domestic HROs, we may observe a substitution of advocacy by
neighborhood HROs that step in to serve the essential role of aiding mobilization for non-
violent protest. Thus, when present, HROs in neighboring countries are expected to amplify
domestic non-violent anti-government protests in states with few HROs themselves.
While the Burmese case provides strong anecdotal support for the occurrence of
advocacy substitution, a puzzle still remains concerning the effects of neighborhood
HROs in countries with well-established HRO and civil society networks. For instance,
would HRO presence in Canada or Mexico have the same amplifying effect in the United
States as the presence of HROs in Thailand does for Burma? This would go against the
idea of HROs using their ﬁnite resources efﬁciently; the United States already has
an established HRO sector, and mobilization efforts from neighboring HROs are
probably less essential for non-violent protest. If a state has a well-developed HRO sector,
it is unlikely that members from neighboring countries will devote their scarce resources
and time to the mobilization of domestic non-violent protest in this saturated HRO state.
In other words, if coordination resources could be classiﬁed as diffusing from an area
of comparative strength to an area of comparative need, we would expect less of a role
of substitute advocacy in a target state with a strong HRO sector. This reﬂects a ceiling
effect dynamic.
This appears to be the case with anti-war protests in the United States. As Heaney and
Rojas’s study found, of the 527 organizations that mobilized anti-war protests in the
United States from 2007 to 2009, only two were from Canada and just one was from
Mexico.43 Given the well-established US domestic HRO sector, organizations in the
neighborhood do not typically aid mobilization attempts within the country.
In addition to our arguments about the diminishing returns of the effects of
neighborhood HROs on non-violent protest, we can expect one additional effect of
neighborhood HROs on saturated target states. In those countries with well-established
domestic HRO sectors, any effect of neighborhood HROs in these states may be observed
through a substitution of strategies. Though most of the focus on domestic opposition
movements is on violent and non-violent protest, we know that these are not the only, or
even the ideal, strategies for political action.44 Opposition activism can take multiple
forms, everything from voting to letter writing, lobbying representatives and non-violent
and violent protests. Thus, if HRO members cross borders to assist in countries with rich
existing HRO sectors, we argue they will turn their attention to other political action
strategies, such as encouraging voting for candidates who would make good advocates of
rights once elected and directly lobbying those in ofﬁce.45 In other words, at sufﬁciently
high levels of domestic HROs, it is likely that protest mobilization strategies are
substituted by alternative forms of political action seen as more effective in achieving the
same overall organizational goals. Any observed effect of neighborhood HROs would be
likely to be seen in these substituted tactics.
42 It is important to note here that, as Murdie and Bhasin (2011) ﬁnd, the resources of HROs can still
diffuse to groups using violent protest that may also make good use of the same training and
communication resources. These resources may have an unintended amplifying effect on domestic violent
protest.
43 Heaney and Rojas 2011.
44 Norris 2011; Tarrow 1994.
45 de Vries 2007; Sikkink 2005.
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In the case of Canadian HROs encouraging anti-war activism in the United States, we also
ﬁnd some anecdotal evidence in line with this strategy of substitution. For example, instead of
aiding in US non-violent protest mobilization, some Canadian HROs are now calling on their
own government to arrest US Vice President Cheney and trying to encourage American
citizens to do the same within the United States.46 Therefore, the impact of neighborhood
HROs, in this case, would be to encourage a change in strategy away from the earlier
approach of anti-war non-violent protests to a more institutional advocacy strategy.
HYPOTHESES
What are the empirical implications of this argument? First, in line with the advocacy
substitution mechanism, we expect neighborhood HROs to serve as a substitute for
domestic HROs in causing more non-violent protests in target states where the domestic
HRO sector is not well established. Therefore, under this substitutable advocacy dynamic,
we would expect that:
MAIN HYPOTHESIS: Higher levels of neighborhood HRO presence are positively associated
with domestic non-violent protest in countries with poor HRO sectors.
It follows that the marginal effects of neighborhood HROs on non-violent protest should be
high when the domestic HRO sector is nascent. However, as the domestic HRO sector
increases, we should expect less of an impact of neighborhood HROs, who are no longer as
critical for mobilizing non-violent protest. Indeed, based on our understanding of HRO
goals, the strategies of neighborhood HROs when the domestic HRO sector is large should
focus on substituting out of domestic non-violent protest to more insider advocacy tactics,
like guiding voters to candidates with strong human rights support and direct lobbying of
existing politicians. Thus, if they are still working within the country next door at all, we
should expect neighborhood HROs to be encouraging a move away from non-violent protest
strategies and to more institutional strategies in those states where such strategies are viable,
i.e. states with a large domestic HRO sector. So we would expect:
SUPPLEMENTARY HYPOTHESIS: At sufﬁciently high levels of domestic HROs, the effect of
neighborhood HROs on domestic non-violent protest will be
diminished.
By this supplementary or corollary hypothesis, we are arguing that there is a ceiling effect for
neighborhood HROs. At sufﬁciently high numbers of domestic organizations, the effect of
neighborhood HROs on non-violent protest diminishes. Any effect of neighborhood HROs
in these states would likely been seen in a substitution from non-violent protest strategies to
more institutional strategies. These insider institutional strategies would be more readily
observed at sufﬁciently high levels of HRO activity. This could have been argued to have
occurred in the case of anti-war protests in the United States, as discussed above.47
In outlining these hypotheses, we remain cognizant, however, of the idea that
grievances in states with sufﬁciently high HROs could be somewhat diminished. In other
words, neighborhood HROs could have a diminished impact on non-violent protest
strategies here because there is less demand for protests overall.48
46 Lawyers Against War 2011.
47 Heaney and Rojas 2011.
48 Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004.
862 BELL, BHASIN, CLAY AND MURDIE
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to test our main hypothesis about substitutable advocacy and our subsequent
hypothesis about diminishing returns and substitutable strategies, we implement a
measure of non-violent protest and estimate a series of negative binomial models.49
Further, to capture the independent variables necessary for testing the above claims, we
generate a measure of neighborhood HRO membership through the use of spatial-
weighting methods. We then interact this indicator with measures of local HRO membership
and, as a robustness test, local HRO ofﬁce or secretariat presence. Further, using
country–year data on a sample of 123 countries from 1990 to 2003, we control for several
factors found in previous studies to be related to the incidence of protest within a state, as well
as for potential spatial and temporal autocorrelation in the level of protest itself. In this
section, we discuss the operationalization of the key concepts in the above theoretical
argument, as well as the included control variables, before discussing our ﬁndings.
Dependent Variable: Non-violent Protest Events
In order to test our hypotheses appropriately, our dependent variable must (1) capture
the level of domestic anti-government protest that occurs within a state in a given year
and (2) focus only on non-violent protest activities. Therefore, like Murdie and Bhasin,
we use Bhasin’s data on the count of all domestic anti-government Non-Violent Protest
events that occurred in a given country–year.50 This measure relies on data from the
Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) project, which provides information on
all daily events in Reuters Global News Service in a ‘who did what to whom, where,
and how’ manner.51 Bhasin focuses on events in which any domestic actor or group
(the ‘who’) acted non-violently (the ‘what’ and ‘how’) against a government agent or
ofﬁce (the ‘to whom’) in a given domestic locale (the ‘where’).52 Thus, the variable
provides a count of the number of domestic protests, boycotts, sit-ins, or other non-
violent activities directed at the government or a government agent in a given year.53
Independent Variables: Local and Neighborhood HRO Presence
Both of our hypotheses require measures of the presence of HROs domestically and in
neighboring states. In the paragraphs that follow, we discuss the measurement of
domestic HRO presence and then describe the methods used to convert the domestic
measures into a measure of neighborhood HRO presence.
Domestic HRO presence. Our ﬁrst measure, Domestic HRO Membership, captures the
number of HROs that have either members or a volunteer base within a country, using
49 We also estimated models implementing a violent protest dependent variable. Our ﬁndings are
consistent with the expectation that the presence of HROs in a state’s neighborhood is unlikely to impact
violent protest in the same way that it impacts non-violent protest. These ﬁndings are available in Table A1 in
our online appendix on the Journal’s website.
50 Bhasin 2008; Murdie and Bhasin 2011.
51 Bond et al. 2003; King and Lowe, 2003.
52 Bhasin 2008.
53 A full list of the non-violent protest events included in this measure can be found in Table A2 of our
online appendix. Like McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith (1996), we make no distinction between routine
and non-routine events and include the possibility of non-violent protest events that originate from
government actors to other members of the government.
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data provided by Smith and Wiest.54 These data were gathered from hard copies of the
Yearbook of International Organizations at intervals of every two to three years.
Following previous uses of these data, the missing years have been linearly interpolated.55
Also similar to previous uses of the data we take the natural log of this measure in order
to reduce skewness and the impact of outliers.
Our second measure of domestic HRO presence, Domestic HRO secretariats, captures
the number of HROs with a permanent ofﬁce location within a state, updated from the
measure used by Murdie and Bhasin.56 Like Smith and Wiest’s data, these data are based
on information from the Yearbook of International Organizations.57 These data are quite
distinct from those on HRO membership. The presence of an ofﬁce represents a much
greater and more lasting investment in a state by the organization, compared with
membership, whose location is likely to be dictated by the members themselves.
Neighborhood HRO presence. Our theory posits that, in the absence of a local
HRO presence, HRO members from neighboring states are capable of substituting
their activities for those of the missing domestic organizations. Thus, we need a way of
measuring the degree to which HROs are active in states that are near enough to the
at-need state and thus most able to provide aid. We rely on spatial-weighting techniques
drawn from the spatial econometrics literature to generate a neighborhood average of our
HRO membership measure.58
In particular, we suggest that, in order for HRO presence to affect the level of
mobilization in surrounding states that lack such a presence, persons and materials must
be capable of traveling to the at-need state. Previous research has indicated that it is likely
that neighboring HRO presence is only capable of exerting an effect over a relatively short
distance.59 Additionally, of our relevant HRO measures, it is HRO membership, as
opposed to HRO secretariats, in neighboring states that would be capable of traveling to
aid in mobilization. In other words, though domestic HRO secretariats may be important
for mobilization, we posit that neighboring HRO secretariats would not have the same
cross-border effects. Thus, we follow this previous work and deﬁne the relevant
neighborhood for our analyses as those states whose minimum distance from the borders
of the state concerned is less than 50 km. Treating all neighbors located within this
distance as contiguous to the referent state, we generate a row-standardized connectivity
matrix, W, which is used to weight each of our HRO presence variables on the basis of,
ﬁrst, whether or not the minimum distance between the borders of states i and j is less
than 50 km and, second, the total number of states whose borders are within 50 km of
state i. Therefore,
Wij5
cij
Snj5 1cij
;
where cij equals 1 if the minimum distance between states i and j is less than 50 km and 0 if
it is not. Given that international borders may change from year to year, W varies across
time to match these changes.
54 Smith and Wiest 2005.
55 Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Murdie and Davis 2012.
56 Murdie and Bhasin 2011.
57 UIA, 2008/2009.
58 See Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Franzese and Hays 2007.
59 Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012.
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Finally, in order to create our measure of Neighborhood HROMembership, we multiply
W by the corresponding data vector of the domestic HRO membership measure. Thus,
this measure provides the average level of HRO membership in states that are within
50 km of the referent state i, whichever state that may be. For instance, throughout our
time period, the United States has two neighbors within 50 km of its borders, i.e. Mexico
and Canada. As such, the Neighborhood HRO Membership value for the United States
should be equal to the number of HROs with members in Canada plus the number of
HROs with members in Mexico, divided by two.60 As a robustness test and for a
necessary control, we also create a neighborhood-weighted measure of the HRO
secretariat, Neighborhood HRO Secretariat.
Data for creating W were obtained by creating adjacency matrices for each year in our
analyses using the CShapes package in R.61 Further, the connectivity matrix was row-
standardized using the spatwmat command in Stata.62 Finally, as we are primarily
concerned with the ability of neighboring HROs to affect local mobilization, we exclude
all states with no neighbors from our analyses.
Control Variables and Model Speciﬁcation
Beyond our variables of primary theoretical interest, previous research has found several
factors that contribute to the likelihood of anti-government protest and we must control
for these in our analyses. First, it is highly likely that the human rights practices of states
are both linked to the likelihood of protest, as well as the activities of HROs.63 Thus we
control for government respect for human rights using the CIRI Human Rights Data
Project’s Physical Integrity Rights Index, which sums four measures of the degree to which
governments respect their citizens’ rights not to be tortured, extrajudicially executed,
politically imprisoned, and disappeared, respectively.64 Each of these individual measures
varies from 0 to 2; the physical integrity rights index thus varies from 0 to 8, with higher
scores representing greater respect for human rights. Likewise, previous work has also
demonstrated both that respect for physical integrity in one state is likely to lead to
improved human rights practices in neighboring states and that persons are likely to
become increasingly dissatisﬁed with their own state’s human rights practices when
exposed to the existence of better practices elsewhere.65 Therefore, we also control for the
Neighborhood Physical Integrity Rights Index, which is generated via the same spatial-
weighting method as that used for the neighborhood HRO membership variable.
Previous research has demonstrated that democracies are less likely to experience
various forms of anti-government activity; we posit that a similar relationship is likely to
60 As suggested by Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley (2006), we recognize that other state connectivities
may also lead to some of the dynamics theorized here, particularly connectivities that reduce the cost of
transferring resources from one state to another. However, robustness tests utilizing measures of HRO
membership weighted by total trade between states, in one case, and colonial history in another found no
relationship between these variables and the occurrence of non-violent protest, while the ﬁndings for the
effects of the neighborhood-based measure discussed here were robust in comparison. These robustness
tests can be found in Table A3 of the online appendix. We hope future research will investigate the
importance of other alternative connectivities in the processes discussed in this study.
61 Weidmann and Gleditsch 2010; Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010.
62 Pisati 2001.
63 Carey 2006; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Regan and Norton 2005.
64 Cingranelli and Richards 2010.
65 Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012; Davis, Murdie, and Garnett 2012.
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exist when looking at non-violent protest.66 In order to gauge the effect of regime type on the
occurrence of protest, we use the Polity score, which varies from 210 (most autocratic) to
10 (most democratic).67 Likewise, previous work has linked economic development to the
likelihood of certain types of antigovernment activity.68 As such, we control for the natural
log of GDP per capita in constant US dollars, as recorded in the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.69 As states with larger populations are both more likely to engage in
repression and more likely to experience certain forms of antigovernment activity we also
control for the natural log of population. Finally, to control for the close relationship between
war and antigovernment activity, we include a control that equals 1 if the state is experiencing
either interstate or intrastate war within its borders and 0 if it is not. These data are based on
information from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Databank.70
In order to account for any differences in non-violent protest counts that may arise
from differing levels of news coverage among countries, we control for the natural log of
total IDEACoverage, i.e. the logged total number of domestic events recorded in the
IDEA database for a given country–year. Furthermore, as previous research has found a
signiﬁcant positive relationship between violent protest and non-violent protest, we
control for the occurrence of the violent protest in each model.71
As our theory explicitly acknowledges the degree to which many outcomes and events cluster
in geographic space as well as time, we control for temporal and spatial autocorrelation in all
models. Our control for temporal autocorrelation is a one-year lag of the dependent variable.
We control for spatial autocorrelation by including a spatially-weighted average of the
dependent variable, generated by the same spatial-weighting method as that used for the
neighborhood HRO membership variable, to create a measure of Neighborhood Non-Violent
Protest. In order to reduce the potential for endogeneity, all independent variables are lagged
one year. Finally, to account properly for over dispersion and positive contagion in the counts
of non-violent protests, we use a negative binomial model with robust standard errors.72
Additional Tests: Ceiling Effect
To evaluate the main hypothesis, we expect to see a positive coefﬁcient on the constituent
terms Domestic HRO Membership (or, as included in the robustness check, Domestic HRO
Secretariat) and the Neighborhood HROmembership. We also expect, reﬂecting the idea of a
ceiling effect, that the interaction terms created from these constituent parts should have a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on nonviolent protest. Remember that our theory
implies that at sufﬁciently high levels of Domestic HROs, we should see Neighborhood
HROs have a diminishing impact on non-violent protest. This is the key insight we seek to
evaluate in the supplemental hypothesis. This, we suggest, could be both due to a substitution
of strategies or could be due to fewer overall grievances.
The basic insight of the supplemental hypothesis can be, at its face, evaluated through
examining the marginal effects of Neighborhood HRO Membership at sufﬁciently high levels
of Domestic HROMembership; at these high levels, the marginal effects should be diminished.
66 See Hegre et al. 2001; Li, 2005; Regan and Bell 2010.
67 Marshall and Jaggers 2009.
68 Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Hegre et al. 2001; Regan and Norton 2005.
69 World Development Indicators 2010.
70 UCDP/PRIO 2008.
71 Murdie and Bhasin 2011.
72 Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long 1997.
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However, we also sought to ﬁnd a way to evaluate what makes these ‘sufﬁciently’ high
Domestic HRO Membership countries different and to what extent these reﬂect different
political repertoires or political opportunity structures and differences in actual or perceived
grievances. We conduct a series of difference of mean t-tests to evaluate these hypotheses.
In particular, we attempt to discern whether there are systematic differences between states
that have a sufﬁciently vibrant domestic HRO sector and those that do not. These are the
states where we expect that non-violent protest will be less necessary for political change,
making it less likely that increases in neighboring HROs amplify the level of non-violent
protest. Part of where that threshold comes from is determined by the results from
conducting tests of the main hypothesis and is discussed more fully below.
In order to examine whether there are other pathways through which these states can
produce political change and whether the populations in these states are less likely to be
aggrieved, we use a series of variables to capture these two concepts. To test whether there
are systematic differences in the pathways for political change, we look at whether there
are differences in the democracy (Polity) levels between the two groups of states. We also
use data from the World Values Survey to identify the proportion of the population that
self identiﬁes as having signed a petition.73 The idea here is that states with an especially
active HRO sector will be more likely to rely on these more institutionalized tools, as
opposed to taking to the streets through protest.
To identify whether these states with more domestic HROs have populations that have
systematically fewer grievances we look at differences in the physical integrity rights
between the two groups of states, differences in GDP per capita, and whether there are
differences in how the populations perceive their human rights treatment. The ﬁrst two
measures come from the same datasets used for testing the main hypothesis. The third
variable is also measured from the World Values Survey data and it comes from a question
that asks whether respondents feel that their human rights are adequately respected.74 Again,
our expectation is that states with larger domestic HRO sectors should have fewer grievances.
The results of these tests follow our discussion of the main results.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we start by testing our core hypothesis, that an increasing presence of HRO
members in neighboring states, when there is a lack of domestic HRO members on the
ground, leads to an increase in the level of non-violent protest within a state. Second, we
examine the difference of means t-tests to ﬂesh out whether there are certain types of
states that are unlikely to experience the additional protest that comes with high levels of
both domestic and neighboring HROs. These are the states where citizens have alternative
pathways available for political change.
Main Hypothesis
Table 1 presents the results from the negative binomial regression model. Again, the
interaction term between domestic HRO membership and neighborhood HRO membership
allows us to draw inferences about whether neighboring HROs ﬁll the advocacy vacuum left
73 World Values Group Research Study Group, 1980–2008.
74 The actual question asked on the World Values Survey is: How much respect is there for individual
human rights nowadays (in our country)? Do you feel: 1 ‘There is a lot of respect for individual human
rights’. 2 ‘There is some respect’. 3 ‘There is not much respect’. 4 ‘There is no respect at all’.
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by a lack of domestic HROs. As a robustness check of this idea, we also include a variable
for domestic HRO secretariat ofﬁce presence and an interaction between that variable
and neighboring HRO membership. We also include a neighborhood variable for HRO
secretariat presence.
As shown in Table 1, the results provide support for our core hypothesis, i.e. that the
presence of HRO members in neighboring states increases the level of non-violent protest
when there is a sufﬁciently low domestic presence of HRO members or HRO secretariats. The
way in which the domestic and neighborhood advocacy pathways substitute for each other is
demonstrated by examining the coefﬁcients on the constituent variables of domestic HRO
membership (or HRO secretariat) and neighborhood HRO membership and the interaction
between them. Consistent with prior work that uses this dependent variable, the presence of
TABLE 1 The Impact of Neighborhood HROs on Non-violent Protest: Negative
Binomial Model with Robust Standard Errors, 1990–2003
Coefﬁcient
Variables (Standard Error)
HRO Secretariatt21 0.0567**
(0.024)
Neighborhood HRO Secretariatt21 0.0217***
(0.006)
HRO Member (ln)t21 0.6613***
(0.181)
Neighborhood HRO Member (ln)t21 0.6629***
(0.211)
HRO Member (ln)3Neighborhood HRO Member (ln)t21 20.2314***
(0.058)
HRO Secretariat (ln)3Neighborhood HRO Member (ln)t21 20.0135**
(0.006)
Violent Protestt21 0.0019**
(0.001)
Non-Violent Protestt21 0.0048***
(0.001)
Neighborhood Non-Violent Protestt21 20.0039**
(0.002)
Neighborhood Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI)t21 0.0194
(0.016)
Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI)t21 20.0565***
(0.017)
Population (ln)t21 0.2353***
(0.030)
GDP per capita (ln)t21 0.0297
(0.028)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)t21 20.1926*
(0.108)
Polity Score (210 to 10)t21 0.0145***
(0.005)
IDEA Coverage (ln)t21 0.4872***
(0.034)
Constant 27.7720***
(0.834)
ln alpha 20.9066***
(0.077)
Observations 1,546
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p, 0.01, **p, 0.05, *p, 0.1 (two-tailed).
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domestic HROs increases the level of non-violent political protest.75 The coefﬁcient for the
neighboring HRO variable is also positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that when the
domestic HRO presence is at zero, the effect of neighboring HROs is positive. The negative
coefﬁcient on the interaction term provides evidence in support of our secondary hypothesis
that, as domestic HRO presence increases, the effect of neighboring HROs is diminished.
The statistically signiﬁcant results on the control variables are largely consistent with
previous ﬁndings. The novel variable that measures neighborhood non-violent protest is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that, after accounting for HRO activities,
states in neighborhoods with a lot of non-violent protest are less likely to experience
non-violent protest themselves. Neighborhood human rights levels are positive, but not
signiﬁcant, suggesting that, if neighborhood human rights practices affect non-violent
protest at all, they do so by increasing its incidence.76
Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of neighboring HRO members on the count of non-
violent protest at varying levels of domestic HRO membership presence. This ﬁgure
shows that, at sufﬁciently low levels of domestic HRO member presence, neighboring
HROs ﬁll the void left by the absence of domestic organizations, and as a result they
increase the level of non-violent protest. It appears that as a state has sufﬁciently high
numbers of domestic HRO members (a value of 3.5 or thirty-three HROs with members
in the state), the effect of an additional neighboring HRO member diminishes. This is
consistent with our secondary hypothesis. In states that are so heavily saturated with a
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Fig. 1. The conditional effect of neighborhood HRO members
75 Murdie and Bhasin 2011.
76 This is unsurprising, given previous research that suggests that human rights-related grievances are
likely to increase as persons become more aware of better practices elsewhere. See Davis, Murdie, and
Garnett 2012. Thus, exposure to better practices in neighboring states informs persons of their own state’s
relative repressiveness, leading to increased grievance and, in our models, increased non-violent protest.
Furthermore, this provides evidence of one mechanism by which improvements in human rights practices
may be predicted by high respect for human rights in neighboring states. See Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012.
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broad based advocacy network and rich civil society, protest is actually less necessary.
There are other substitutable strategies that these organizations can engage in to pursue
political change. If this is the case, we should expect this category of states to be more
democratic, to have better human rights records, and to be states that provide grievance
expression mechanisms other than protest.
Of course, we are also interested in the result on the interaction term between domestic
HRO secretariats and neighboring HRO members. This interaction terms allows for
inferences to be drawn regarding whether neighboring member presence can also
substitute for the lack of presence of domestic secretariat ofﬁces. The coefﬁcient on the
interaction term is also negative and statistically signiﬁcant, consistent with our
expectation that the presence of HRO members in neighboring states will produce
diminishing returns in the presence of an active domestic HRO secretariat presence.77
Overall, these ﬁndings allow for the inference that, in general, HROs increase the level
of non-violent political protest in a state. Consistent with Murdie and Bhasin, when there
is a vibrant HRO sector inside a state, there will be greater levels of non-violent political
protest.78 What we show here is that HROs can increase domestic protest even in the
absence of an active domestic HRO sector. When there is a deﬁcit of local organizations,
HRO members located in neighboring states can ﬁll the void and spur greater non-violent
protest. When there are sufﬁcient numbers of domestic HROs, however, neighboring
HROs do not amplify non-violent protest.
Supplemental Hypothesis: Additional Tests
To evaluate the supplemental hypothesis concerning the ceiling effect and a substitution
of strategies more thoroughly, we want to know whether there are systematic differences
between the states that have high domestic HRO membership and those that do not. The
model in Table 1 indicates that at these high levels of domestic HRO membership, the
effect of an increase in neighboring HRO presence actually decreases the level of non-
violent protest. This is consistent with our theoretical claim underlying the supplemental
hypothesis that these types of states will have alternative pathways through which
political change can occur and are also likely to experience fewer grievances. As a further
check on this claim, we provide two sets of tests here.
First, from Figure 1, it is apparent that when the logged HRO domestic membership
measure equals or exceeds 3.5, i.e. when there are more than thirty-three HROs with
domestically-based members, additional neighboring HRO members serve to decrease the
level of non-violent protest. We ﬁrst examine whether these states that are above the
3.5 threshold on the measure of domestic HRO presence have statistically signiﬁcantly
higher levels of democracy, as measured by the 210 to 110 Polity scale. If they do, this
provides some support for the hypothesis that these kinds of states have alternative
pathways to petition government for change. This does not mean that we will never see
protest in these states, but that HROs and individuals have other tools in their toolbox to
choose from and that the addition of neighboring HROs could make them more likely to
use these institutionalized tools. We ﬁnd that the difference of means in Polity scores
between the states below the 3.5 threshold on domestic HRO membership and those
77 Marginal effects graphs of this interaction are available in Figure A1 of the online appendix and
reﬂect, again, the basic logic shown in Figure 1 concerning the substitution of advocacy.
78 Murdie and Bhasin 2011.
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above is statistically signiﬁcant, with a mean of 6.16 for those above 3.5 and a mean of
20.35 for those below the 3.5 threshold (see Table 2).
We also use the World Values Survey data described above to test this hypothesis more
rigorously. The sample is again split between those states above 3.5 on domestic HRO
membership (ln) and those below. A difference of means test is conducted to determine
whether the proportion of individuals within a state that sign petitions is different for the
two groups of observations. The test suggests that those states below the threshold have
statistically signiﬁcantly fewer people self-reporting as having signed a petition than those
states that are above the threshold. In the states with fewer HROs the average proportion
to report having signed a petition is 19.6 percent; in the states with more than the
threshold on the domestic HRO measure the proportion is 30.2 percent. This serves to
demonstrate that the states that are above this threshold on domestic HRO presence can
turn towards other tactics for policy change that might directly engage policy makers as
opposed to non-violent protests. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that the effect of
neighboring HROs diminishes at sufﬁciently high levels of domestic HRO presence.
The second set of tests gauge whether there are likely to be fewer grievances in the states
that are above this 3.5 threshold on the domestic HRO member variable. This will further
help to explain why the effect of neighboring HRO members diminishes when a strong
domestic HRO sector exists. The ﬁrst test compares the mean on physical integrity rights
between the cases above and below the 3.5 threshold. The cases above the 3.5 threshold
have an average physical integrity rights score of 4.15 and the cases below the
3.5 threshold have an average score of 4.98. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant and
suggests that individuals who live in these states with a greater number of HROs are less
likely to experience repression.
TABLE 2 T-Tests: Differences in Strategies and Grievances between Countries with
High HRO Membership and Countries without High HRO Membership
Variable
Group (no. of
observations) Mean (SE) Differencey
Prob.
Diff., 0
Polity (210 to 110) Score HRO Members below
threshold (833) 20.35 (0.22) 26.52 (0.30) ,0.01***
HRO Members above
threshold (713) 6.17 (0.19)
Proportion having signed
a petition (WVS)
HRO Members below
threshold (15) 0.20 (0.03) 20.11 (0.07) 0.03*
HRO Members above
threshold (50) 0.30 (0.03)
Physical Integrity Rights
Index (CIRI)
HRO Members below
threshold (833) 4.15 (0.08) 20.83 (0.12) ,0.01***
HRO Members above
threshold (713) 4.99 (0.09)
GDP per capita HRO Members below
threshold (833) 2,480.11 (162.61) 26,272.99 (395.80) ,0.01***
HRO Members above
threshold (713) 8,753.10 (383.33)
Proportion believing their
human rights are
‘respected a lot’ (WVS)
HRO Members below
threshold (17) 0.06 (0.02) 20.07 (0.03) ,0.01***
HRO Members above
threshold (39) 0.13 (0.02)
Notes: y Low HRO Group Mean minus High HRO Group Mean. WVS5World Values Survey.
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In addition, the per capita incomes between these two groups of states are substantially
different. The difference between the two groups is $6,272 and is statistically signiﬁcant.
Economic conditions are stronger in the states with greater numbers of domestic HRO
members. This general higher economic performance provides fewer reasons to protest in
the states with many domestic HRO members.
The next test also uses the World Values Survey data and compares the level of
respondents that believe their human rights are ‘respected a lot’ by their government. For
the states above 3.5 the proportion of respondents answering that their human rights
are respected ‘a lot’ is 13.4 percent, for the states in the sample below 3.5 the mean is
6.1 percent. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant. This result provides evidence that
individuals in these states with more domestic HROs are less likely to feel as though their
human rights are being violated and to be aggrieved.
Overall the ﬁndings here provide evidence to help bolster this claim that the states with the
most vibrant HRO sectors are going to have more tools to choose from for enacting policy
change and fewer actual grievances towards their governments. The individuals in these states
are more likely to have democratic institutions to engender policy change. They are also less
likely to have their human rights violated by the government, have higher per capita income,
and perceive a higher level of respect for their human rights. This should all result in fewer
grievances against the government and also less non-violent protest.
CONCLUSION
This work makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the existing literature.
Theoretically, it provides an important piece of the puzzle surrounding the work of
HROs. It sets clear expectations for the conditions under which HROs inﬂuence non-
violent protest across borders. We ﬁnd that neighborhood HRO members can aid their
brothers-in-arms in mobilization attempts.
This ﬁnding has import for both scholars and practitioners. For scholars, this is further
evidence in support of the global reach of HROs. HROs have goals in groups of states
and activities that cross state boundaries reﬂect these goals. Practitioners can learn from
HROs that are already engaging in these cross-border activities and mirror these successful
strategies elsewhere. This bodes well particularly for those interested in aiding domestic
mobilization in countries where domestic HRO presence has been underdeveloped
historically, such as Syria or Burma. Instead of having to depend on local members or
ofﬁces of HROs to aid in mobilization attempts, we ﬁnd that neighborhood HRO members
can serve as powerful substitutes for the advocacy mobilization previously thought to result
from domestic HROs alone.
If domestic HRO members are ﬂourishing, we ﬁnd that neighborhood HROs have a
ceiling effect: they do not increase nonviolent protest. It may be that any efforts of
neighborhood HROs in these states work to substitute strategies away from protest and
to more institutionalized advocacy strategies. These ﬁndings are consistent with a view of
HROs as organizations that have goals across borders and that work in a strategic way to
achieve these goals most efﬁciently.
Previous work has shown that neighboring HRO members improve the human rights
records of states.79 This work helps to elaborate the role of these organizations in enacting
political change inside of neighboring states. The results here provide additional evidence
79 Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012.
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that HROs engage in activities in states other than those in which they were originally
based, but also that HROs use their resources efﬁciently through varied mobilization
strategies on the ground.
More broadly, this research challenges conventional notions of how HROs and other
transnational non-state actors affect domestic politics.80 Instead of needing to be involved
directly within a state, transnational actors like HROs can still be powerful conduits for
domestic anti-government behavior even without having a formal presence within the
country. In short, instead of waiting for the ﬁght to develop organically from the domestic
population of a state, neighborhood HROs are willing to take the ﬁght to them. This ﬁnding
reiterates the potential of international actors to implement change in the domestic realm.
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